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In  a  three period  overlapping  generations  model,  I  show  that  different 
combinations of preference and technological parameters can lead to different 
patterns  on  the  joint  evolution  of  human  capital  and  (endogenous)  fertility 
choices. These patterns may include threshold effects and multiple equilibria as 
well  as  endogenous  fluctuations.  In  the  latter  case,  fertility  is  procyclical. 
Contrary to existing analyses, endogenous economic fluctuations emerge only 
when the substitution effects (rather than the income effects) dominate. I also 
show that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution may be an additional factor 
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1   Introduction 
For the most part of the last two centuries, the process of economic growth in currently 
developed  countries  has  been  accompanied  by  some  salient  demographic  trends.  In 
particular, the demographic structures in these countries have changed drastically as both 
fertility and mortality rates have displayed a clear tendency to fall while life expectancy has 
risen significantly (Dyson and Murphy, 1985; Kirk, 1996; Ehrlich and Lui, 1997). Greater 
funding opportunities and technological advancements that have supported both medical 
and  pharmaceutical  research,  better  nutrition,  improved  sanitation,  the  design  and 
implementation of health and safety rules – these are some of the reasons that can provide a 
straightforward explanation on why the process of economic development is accompanied 
by improvements in health conditions that lead to lower mortality and higher life expectancy.  
Nevertheless, the apparent reduction in birth rates, which constitutes the other important 
aspect of demographic transition, in not as straightforward to explain. For this reason, a 
burgeoning literature has been seeking to provide possible theoretical explanations based on 
models that account for the joint determination of economic and demographic outcomes 
(e.g., Becker and Barro, 1988; Becker et al., 1990; Tamura, 1996; Dahan and Tsiddon, 1998; 
Galor and Weil, 2000; Palivos, 2001; Hazan and Berdugo, 2002; Blackburn and Cipriani, 
2002; Lagerlöf, 2003; Kalemli Ozcan, 2003, Currais et al., 2009; Kitaura, 2009).   
     Despite this strong interest, however, there is still an aspect of demographic transition 
that has not received enough attention. Specifically, a closer look at the data reveals that, for 
the greatest part of the period that constitutes the demographic transition, fertility rates have 
displayed  significant  variations  around  their  declining  trends.  In  fact,  researchers  have 
identified such patterns for the large majority of developed countries (Easterlin, 1987, 2000; 
Chesnais, 1992; Lee, 1997). Boldrin et al. (2005) offer a more revealing discussion on this 
issue. They focus on data from the United States and many European countries from the 
beginning of the 20
th century onwards and, in particular, the Baby Bust Baby Boom Baby 
Bust episodes that occurred during that period. Measuring deviations of the Total Fertility 
Rate and Total Factor Productivity, they show that the periods during which both are either 
above or below their respective trends are largely coincidental. Thus, they argue that fertility 
rates are procyclical. If anything, this observation reveals that fluctuations in birth rates are 
(to a large extent) inherently linked to economic conditions.    3 
     The first theoretical model to show the possibility of fertility oscillations (permanent or 
damped) is that of Kemp and Kondo (1986). They use an overlapping generations model 
with bequests and derive conditions under which both the economy’s capital stock and the 
fertility  rate  fluctuate  at  opposite  directions.  Benhabib  and  Nishimura  (1989)  use  the 
framework of Becker and Barro (1988) in which they generalise the function that determines 
the relative importance of children’s well being for parent’s utility. Their results show that 
population growth and income per capita can be positively related; they may also display 
cyclical patterns. Strulik (1999) incorporates life expectancy in a model of optimal saving and 
fertility decisions. Assuming that life expectancy is positively related to income per capita, he 
generates rich dynamics for capital accumulation and population growth – dynamics that 
lead  to  multiple  equilibria  and,  under  circumstances,  endogenous  cycles  in  fertility  and 
income per capita. Feichtinger and Dockner (1990) are able to derive endogenous fertility 
fluctuations by incorporating habit formation in consumption and assuming that the births 
are an increasing function of the difference between current consumption and a weighted 
average  of  past  consumption  levels.  Azariadis  (1993)  uses  a  dynamic  model  where 
reproductive agents live for one period and production utilises labour and land. He shows 
conditions under which land usage and population growth admit periodic equilibria. Finally, 
Jones and Schoonbroodt (2007) deviate from the aforementioned analyses in that they seek 
to  explain  fluctuations  in  fertility  as  the  result  of  optimal  decisions  in  the  presence  of 
exogenous  productivity  shocks.  Thus,  rather  than  focusing  on  damped  oscillations  or 
periodic equilibria emerging from non monotonicity in the economy’s dynamic behaviour, 
they build a stochastic variant of the Becker and Barro (1988) framework in which they 
incorporate  temporary  productivity  shocks.  They  find  that,  indeed,  fertility  can  be 
procyclical; therefore, the fertility rate fluctuates around its trend as a result of exogenous 
productivity disturbances.     
     In  this  paper,  I  construct  a  model  of  economic  growth  with  endogenous  fertility 
decisions and human capital accumulation. My model reveals that different combinations of 
preference  and  technological  parameters  determine  whether  optimal  fertility  is  either  a 
decreasing or an increasing function of the stock of human capital. In the former case, the 
dynamics  of  human  capital  accumulation  are  monotonic  and  fertility  declines  as  the 
economy grows towards its steady state equilibrium. Furthermore, it is also possible that 
these  dynamics  are  dictated  by  threshold  effects  for  which  initial  conditions  determine   4 
whether the economy remains in a poverty trap with declining income and increasing fertility 
or achieves positive transitory growth coupled with decreasing fertility. In the latter case, 
however,  outcomes  may  be  drastically  different.  Particularly,  the  emergence  of  non 
monotonic dynamics leads to (damped or permanent) oscillations, i.e., endogenous volatility. 
Given the response of fertility to differences in the stock of human capital, these dynamics 
are translated into volatile fertility rates. Another interesting aspect of my model is that, 
under certain conditions, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution may be an additional 
factor determining whether the economy sustains a positive growth rate in the long run.  
     As an analysis of endogenous economic volatility, the model presented in this paper 
should not be viewed as yet another framework in which the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution is an important source of endogenous cycles. The reason for this is twofold. 
Firstly, the relative strength of other structural parameters, in addition to the elasticity of 
intertemporal  substitution,  is  a  crucial  determinant  of  the  economy’s  dynamics  and  the 
emergence of fluctuations. Secondly, while some other analyses require dominant income 
effects – alternatively, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution below one – for periodic 
equilibria to exist (e.g., Grandmont, 1985; Azariadis and Guesnerie, 1986; Benhabib and 
Laroque, 1988), in my model such equilibria may exist only if the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution  is  above  one;  that  is,  endogenous  volatility  requires  dominant  substitution 
effects.
1      
     The  remaining  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  In  Section  2  I  describe  the  economic 
environment. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the economy’s temporary and dynamic equilibrium 
respectively. In Section 5 I discuss the cyclical nature of fertility decisions and in Section 6 I 
modify the model so as to allow for long run growth. Section 7 concludes.     
                  
2   The Economy 
Consider an artificial economy in which time takes the form of discrete periods that are 
indexed by  0,1,..., t = ¥. The economy is populated by agents who belong to overlapping 
generations and have a lifespan of three periods – childhood, young adulthood, and old 
                                                 
1 Under different settings, Huang and Madden (1996) and Lahiri and Puhakka (1998) have also shown that 
endogenous  cycles  can  emerge  even  when  income  effects  do  not  dominate.  Huang  and  Madden  (1996) 
illustrate that this is possible when the demand for labour is inelastic. Lahiri and Puhakka (1998) achieve this 
result by adding habit persistence.     5 
adulthood. An agent born in period  t  is for the most part inactive during childhood: she 
does not make any decisions by herself but attends some type of basic education (provided 
costlessly and assimilated effortlessly) that allows her to begin her adulthood equipped with 
the  average  stock  of  human  capital  available  at  the  beginning  of  period  1 t + .  At  the 
beginning  of  her  young  adulthood  she  is  also  endowed  with  a  unit  of  time  and  an 
entrepreneurial  technology  that  allows  her  to  transform  efficient  labour  (i.e.,  raw  time 
augmented  by  the  stock  of  knowledge  and  expertise)  into  units  of  the  economy’s 
homogeneous good. During her youth, she also decides how much to consume, how many 
children to bear, and how much effort to devote for the accumulation of human capital. 
Given that the economy’s homogeneous good is perishable and non storable, accumulating 
human  capital  is  the  only  way  she  can  transfer  real  resources  towards  her  old  age.  In 
particular,  when  old,  she  combines  her  human  capital  together  with  a  unit  of  time  and 
produces units of output by utilising her entrepreneurial technology. She decides how much 
to consume and, at the end of the period, she passes away naturally.  
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where  1
t
t c +  denotes consumption during youth,  2
t
t c +  denotes consumption during old age and 
1
t
t n +  denotes the number of children that the agent will give birth to and raise during her 
youth. The  utility  function  presented  in  (1)  has the  following characteristics. Firstly,  the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution between activities that offer well being in different 
periods of a person’s lifetime may have a value that differs from one. Secondly, I have used a 
flexible  parameterisation  to  indicate  the  relative  importance  of  the  components  that 
determine well being during young adulthood. As we shall see later, both these ideas will 
have significant implications for the outcomes that transpire in equilibrium.  
     During her youth, the agent decides how to divide her time between the production of 
output, the accumulation of human capital and the rearing of her children. I assume that 
raising a child requires  0 q >  units of time. Therefore, her consumption during youth is 
determined by  
                                                 
2 I employ the convention of using subscripts to indicate the period during which an activity takes place and 
superscripts to indicate the birth date of the agent that undertakes this activity.     6 
  1 1 1 1 (1 )
t t t
t t t t c e qn H + + + + = - - ,  (2) 
where  1
t
t e +  denotes the fraction of her time spent on accumulating human capital and  1 t H +  is 
the average stock of human capital in the economy available at the beginning of period  1 t + . 
Recall that this is the stock of human capital available to the agent at the beginning of her 
young adulthood.  
     The  agent  combines her  existing  stock  of  human  capital  together  with  the  time  she 
devotes towards activities that augment her knowledge and expertise so as to generate the 
stock of human capital that will be available during her old age. Denoting the latter by  2
t
t h + , 
it evolves according to  
  2 1 1,    0,  (0,1)
t t ψ
t t t h φe H φ ψ + + + = > Î .  (3) 
Later, it will become clear that  ψ is another parameter with significant implications for the 
model’s main results.  
     Given that the agent’s only reproductive period is her young adulthood, in period  2 t +  
she combines the whole unit of time together with her stock of human capital so as to 
produce output. She uses the income received from this activity to satisfy her consumption 
needs when old. Hence, her consumption during old adulthood is dictated by   
  2 2
t t
t t c h + + = .  (4) 
     The previous analysis constitutes the analytical description of the economic environment. 
Thus, the model summarised through equations (1) (4) can be used to derive the economy’s 
temporary  and  dynamic  equilibrium  and  analyse  their  characteristics.  This  is  a  task 
undertaken in the following Sections.  
 
3   The Temporary Equilibrium 
The temporary equilibrium can be described through  
 
Definition  1.  The  temporary  equilibrium  of  the  economy  is  a  set  of  quantities 
{ 1 2 1 1 1 2 , , , , ,
t t t t t
t t t t t t c c n e H h + + + + + + } such that: 
(i)  Given  1 t H + , the quantities  1
t
t c + ,  2
t
t c + ,  1
t
t e + ,  1
t
t n +  and  2
t
t h +  solve the optimisation problem of 
an agent born in t ;    7 
(ii) 
t
t j t j h H + + =  for  1,2,... j = . 
 
     It  is  straightforward  to  establish  that  the  model  generates  interior  equilibria  for  the 
variables that comprise the agent’s set of choices. For this reason, we can substitute (2), (3) 
and (4) in (1) in order to express the problem as   
  ( )
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
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subject to  
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     After some tedious but straightforward algebra, we can find the solution for  1
t
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The optimal fertility rate,  1
t
t n + , is equal to 
  1 1 1
1








= - = .  (8) 
It is also instructive to write down the solution for the time that the agent devotes for the 
production of output during her youth, i.e.,  1 1 1
t t
t t e qn + + - - . Using the results in (6) and (8), 
this is found to be     
  1 1 1 1 1 [1 ( )] ( )
t t
t t t t e qn α ε H l H + + + + - - = - = .  (9) 
     The solutions given in equations (6), (8) and (9) allow us to clarify some previous remarks 
on the importance of the parameters σ , α  and ψ. In order to formalise the argument, let us 
begin by setting  1 σ = . In this case, the composite parameter terms in (7) become   
    and   0 ω β δ = = .  (10) 
Therefore, the solutions in (6), (8) and (9) are reduced to   
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and  







+ + - - = =
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.  (13) 
It is obvious that, as long as  1 σ = , the optimal allocation of time during youth is invariant to 
the existing stock of human capital. The reason for this outcome is as follows. The stock of 
human  capital  generates  substitution  and  income  effects  through  its  presence  in  the 
technology that determines the young adult’s output (see equation (2)) and in the technology 
that determines the accumulation of human capital (see equation (3)) which, in turn, dictates 
the amount of output at the disposal of the agent during her old age (see equation (4)). If the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is restricted to be equal to one, then the magnitude of 
these effects is such that they cancel each other out. 
     Nevertheless, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is not the only important factor 
in the determination of a young adult’s optimal allocation of time. As mentioned previously, 
the parameters  ψ and  α  are also crucial in this respect. This argument can be clarified 
through  
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Proof. Substitute (7) in  (6) and use the resulting expression in (8) and (9). Subsequently, 
calculate the derivatives of  1 ( ) t ε H + ,  1 ( ) t l H +  and  1 ( ) t v H +  with respect to  1 t H + .   □ 
   9 
     Let us try to understand the intuition behind these results by considering the impact of a 
higher human capital stock. Naturally, this implies that the marginal utility cost of devoting 
time to activities that increase human capital (i.e., the opportunity cost of not producing 
output during youth) is higher. This is because the higher stock of human capital increases 
the amount of income received (and, correspondingly, the amount of goods that can be 
purchased and consumed) for every unit of labour time devoted during the person’s youth. 
The substitution effect induces the agent to increase labour time at the expense of the time 
she spends accumulating human capital. Given that the number of children that the agent 
rears is effectively a normal good, the optimal response will be to increase her fertility rate. 
Nevertheless, there is an income effect as well. Given the convexity of preferences, the agent 
will optimally wish to smooth her consumption profile over the lifetime. The only way she 
can achieve this is by accumulating human capital – doing so will increase the resources that 
she can produce during her old adulthood and, therefore, allow her to consume more during 
this later stage of her lifespan. This effect will induce her to reduce the time she spends 
producing output and rearing children during her young adulthood.  
     There is a second set of substitution and income effects, however. These effects relate to 
the  impact  of  the  current  human  capital  stock  on  the  formation  of  human  capital  – 
consequently, the amount of income received during old age and, therefore, the marginal 
utility benefit from old age consumption. The substitution effect will induce the agent to 
spend more time accumulating human capital during her youth, at the expense of the time 
she spends producing output and raising children. However, there is an income effect related 
to the fact that the agent wants to smooth her consumption profile. In this case, she can 
achieve this by increasing her income and, therefore, consumption during youth. Optimally, 
she will reduce the time spent on the accumulation of human capital and she will increase 
the time she devotes to the production of output. Since the number of children raised is a 
normal good, her fertility rate will increase as well.  
     The elasticity of intertemporal substitution determines whether income or substitution 
effects dominate. Given the previous discussion, however, we have two sets of such effects 
that  work  in  the  opposite  direction.  So  what  determines  the  ultimate  outcome?  As 
summarised  in  Proposition  1,  for  given  values  of  σ ,  the  ultimate  outcome  will  be 
determined by the parameters ψ and α  (in particular, the sign of the difference ψ α - ). We 
can clarify the intuition as follows. Suppose that  (0,1) σ Î  so that the substitution effects   10 
dominate the income effects. Since the substitution effects are conflicting, the equilibrium 
outcome will be determined by the relative strengths of ψ  and α . Given an increase in the 
stock  of  human  capital,  if  ψ α >   (ψ α < )  the  marginal  utility  benefit  from  old  age 
consumption  is  stronger  (weaker)  compared  to  the  marginal  utility  benefit  from  the 
consumption  during  young  adulthood.  Correspondingly,  the  agent  will  find  optimal  to 
increase (decrease) the time she spends accumulating human capital and, at the same time, 
reduce (increase) her effort towards other activities – mainly, childrearing and production – 
during  her  youth.  Now,  suppose  that  1 σ >   so  that  the  income  effects  dominate  the 
substitution  effects.  Again  the  income  effects  are  conflicting,  therefore  the  equilibrium 
outcome will be determined by the relative strengths of  ψ and  α . For a higher stock of 
human capital, if  ψ α >  (ψ α < ) the marginal utility benefit from consuming when young is 
stronger (weaker) compared to the marginal utility benefit from consuming when old. As a 
result,  the  young  adult  will  find  optimal  to  reduce  (increase)  the  time  she  spends 
accumulating human capital. Furthermore, she will optimally increase (reduce) the number 
of children she bears because increased (reduced) production endows her with more (fewer) 
resources during her young adulthood.   
     The qualitative nature of these effects reveals that they may have significant repercussions 
for the dynamics of human capital accumulation. Consequently, equation (8) reveals that 
there  may  also  be  important  implications  for  the  dynamics  of  fertility.  These  issues  are 
formally analysed and discussed in the subsequent Section.   
 
4   The Dynamic Equilibrium  
In this model, I have assumed that agents within an age group are identical. Hence, given 
Definition 1, it is  2 2
t




















.  (14) 
This first order difference equation describes the dynamics of human capital accumulation. 
By equation (8), this expression will dictate the dynamics of the fertility rate. Thus, the 
economy’s dynamic equilibrium is described in  
 
Definition 2. The dynamic equilibrium is a sequence of temporary equilibria that satisfy    11 
(i)  2 1 ( ) t t H F H + + = ;  
(ii)  1 1 ( )
t
t t n ν H + + = . 
 
     Earlier, we identified the fact that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is a potential 
source of rich economic and demographic effects, as long as it deviates from the value of 
one. For this reason, it is instructive to examine the dynamic outcomes that transpire in the 
baseline case where  1 σ = . I summarise these outcomes in    
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that  1 σ = . There is a unique asymptotically stable steady state  0 H > . In the 
transition to this stationary equilibrium, the fertility rate remains constant, i.e.,  1
t
t n ν + =   t " .  
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   □    
 
     The human capital dynamics associated with Proposition 1 are illustrated in Figure 1. As 
the economy converges to its steady state equilibrium, the fertility rate remains constant 
because, for reasons explained in the preceding Section, the stock of human capital does not 
impinge  on  a  young  adult’s  decisions.  For  the  subsequent  parts  of  the  analysis,  the 
assumption of a unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution is relaxed.      
 
Figure 1 
1 t H +   0  H  
1 ( ) t F H +  
2 t H +    12 
 
4.1   The Case with  0 1 ( , ) σ Î Î Î Î    
When the CRRA coefficient  ( ) σ  is positive but below one, the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution (1/ ) σ  takes values above one. This implies that substitution effects dominate 
income effects and, in terms of our model, leads to the outcomes summarised in the first 
part  of Proposition  1.  As  we  discussed  earlier,  the qualitative  nature  of  these  outcomes 
depends on the strength of the parameters determining the formation of human capital (ψ) 
and the relative importance of consumption for a young adult’s well being (α ). We can begin 
the analysis of the economy’s dynamics with    
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that ψ α > .  
(i)  If  1
1
σ
δ ψ α ψ α
σ
+ < ⇒ + > >
-
 then there is a unique asymptotically stable steady state 
* 0 H > . In the transition to this stationary equilibrium, the fertility rate declines towards its 
long run equilibrium 
* ( ) ν H ;  
(ii)  If  1
1
σ
δ ψ ψ α
σ
+ > ⇒ > +
-
 then there are two asymptotically stable steady states, 
*
1 0 H =  
and 
*
3 0 H > , separated by an unstable steady state 
* *
2 3 (0, ) H H Î .  For an initial condition 
below 
*
2 H ,  the  stock  of  human  capital  declines  towards 
*
1 0 H =   while  the  fertility  rate 
increases towards  (0) ν .  For  an  initial  condition  above 
*
2 H , the  stock  of  human  capital 
increases towards 
*
3 H  while the fertility rate declines towards 
*
3 ( ) ν H . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   □    
 
      The possible outcomes summarised in Proposition 3 are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. 
Recall that when 0 1 σ < <  and ψ α > , young adults respond to a higher human capital stock 
by increasing the time they spend on activities that promote human capital formation at the 
expense of output production and childrearing. According to equation (3), this result implies 
that there is a complementarity between the existing human capital stock and human capital 
investment.  When  /(1 ) α σ σ ψ + - > ,  this  complementarity  is  not  strong  enough  and   13 
therefore,  the return  to human  capital  investment  is still  high when  the existing  human 
capital stock is relatively low. As a result, the rate of human capital formation guarantees a 
unique interior equilibrium. Given that the higher stock of human capital induces agents to 
reduce the number of children they give birth to, the fertility rate declines as the economy 
grows towards its steady state. When  /(1 ) ψ α σ σ > + - , the equilibrium outcomes become 
richer.  Now,  the  complementarity  between  the  human  capital  stock  and  human  capital 
investment is strong enough to ensure that, for any 
*
1 2 t H H + < , the return to human capital 
investment is so low that the rate of human capital accumulation is negative. Effectively, 
*
2 H  
emerges as an endogenous threshold that determines long term prospects according to initial 
conditions. On the one hand, an economy that is endowed with human capital below 
*
2 H  
will fall into a poverty trap: the growth rate is negative and the continuously declining human 
capital stock will lead to increasing fertility rates over time. On the other hand, an economy 
that is endowed with human capital above 
*
2 H  will grow at positive rates as it converges to 
its long run equilibrium: as the stock of human capital increases, the fertility rate falls.




                                                 
3  A  necessary  condition  for  the  existence  of  interior  equilibria  in  this  case  is  ( ) F X X >   where 
1/ [( 1)/(1 ) ]
δ X δ ψ ψ ω = + - - . More details are provided in the Appendix.   
1 t H +   0  * H  
1 ( ) t F H +  





     So far, the analysis and discussion have focused on cases where  ψ α > . Nevertheless, 
there  are  parameter  configurations  for  which  ψ α < .  What  are  the  implications  for  the 
economy’s long term prospects in this case? One possible outcome is summarised in       
 
Proposition 4. Suppose that  0 (1 ) δ ψ α ψ σ α + > ⇒ > > - . There is a unique asymptotically stable 
steady state  0 H > ɶ . In the transition to this stationary equilibrium, the fertility rate increases towards its 
long run equilibrium  ( ) ν H ɶ .  
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   □    
 
     Recall that, as long as  ψ α < , a higher stock of human capital induces young adults to 
spend more time producing output and raising children – at the same time, they devote less 
time for the accumulation of human capital. In principle, this implies that when the stock of 
human capital is high enough, the return to human capital investment may become negative. 
Nonetheless, when  (1 ) α ψ σ α > > -  this situation does not emerge. The return to human 
1 t H +   0 
*
3 H  
1 ( ) t F H +  
2 t H +  
*
2 H    15 
capital  investment  is  still  sufficient  enough  to  ensure  that  the  economy  will  grow 
monotonically towards its long run equilibrium. The difference with previous scenarios is 
that the fertility rate actually increases during the transition period because, for ψ α < , young 
adults respond to the higher human capital stock by increasing the time they spend towards 






     The  most  interesting  dynamics  emerge  with  the  case  where  (1 ) ψ σ α < - .  This  is  the 
scenario  where  endogenous  volatility  in  economic  activity  and  fertility  rates  becomes  a 
possible outcome. I summarise this scenario in    
 
Proposition 5. Suppose that  0 (1 ) δ ψ ψ σ α + < ⇒ < - . There is a unique interior steady state  ˆ 0 H >  
such that:   
(i)  If  ˆ ( ) 1 F H ¢ <  then  ˆ H  is asymptotically stable. The transition to this stationary equilibrium 
may not necessarily be monotonic. Instead, human capital may converge to  ˆ H  through damped 
oscillations,  i.e.,  1 ˆ ˆ ( )( ) 0 t j t j H H H H + + + - - <   and  1 ˆ ˆ lim( )( ) 0 t j t j t H H H H + + + ®¥ - - =   
1 t H +   0  H ɶ  
1 ( ) t F H +  
2 t H +    16 
for  1,2,... j = . When this happens, the fertility rate also converges to its long run equilibrium 
ˆ ( ) ν H   through  damped  oscillations,  i.e.,  1 ˆ ˆ [ ( ) ( )][ ( ) ( )] 0 t j t j ν H ν H ν H ν H + + + - - <   and 
1 ˆ ˆ lim[ ( ) ( )][ ( ) ( )] 0 t j t j t ν H ν H ν H ν H + + + ®¥ - - =  for  1,2,... j = .  
(ii)  If  ˆ ( ) 1 F H ¢ < -  then  ˆ H  is unstable. Oscillations in the dynamics of human capital are 
permanent, i.e., there may be two or more periodic equilibria. If there are two periodic equilibria 
1 H
⌣
  and  2 H
⌣
,  they  satisfy    1 2 ˆ 0 H H H < < <
⌣ ⌣
  and  1 2 ˆ ˆ ( )( ) 0 H H H H - - <
⌣ ⌣
. 
Correspondingly,  the  fertility  rate  will  oscillate  permanently  as  well.  That  is, 
1 2 ˆ ˆ [ ( ) ( )][ ( ) ( )] 0 ν H ν H ν H ν H - - <
⌣ ⌣
.   
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   □    
 
     The dynamics described in these cases are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. At relatively high 
values for the human capital stock, the slope of the transition equation in (14) may actually 
change sign and become negative. If the fixed point generated by (14) lies on the downward 
sloping part of the dynamics, convergence to the steady state may be cyclical rather than 
monotonic. There may even be convergence to a stable cycle – human capital may fluctuate 
permanently around its fixed point. The intuition for this result is the following. Suppose 
that the human capital stock is low. Young adults will respond by devoting more time to the 
accumulation of human capital and less time producing output. With lower income, they 
choose to raise fewer children as well. Next period however, the available stock of human 
capital will be relatively high as a result of the previous generation’s effort. This will induce 
young adults to produce more output and raise more children at the expense of the time they 
spend accumulating human capital. The latter effect implies a lower endowment of human 
capital for the subsequent generation of young adults. As a result, they will decide to invest 
more time to the accumulation of human capital, at the expense of output production and 
childrearing, and so on.
4  
                                                 
4 In terms of a numerical example, suppose that  0.8 α = ,  1.5 φ = ,  0.1 σ = ,  0.3 ψ = ,  0.01 q =  and  0.8 β = . 
Then  ˆ 0.606848 H =  and  ˆ ( ) 2.08516 F H ¢ = - . In this case, human capital and fertility rates fluctuate around 









1 t H +   0 
1 ( ) t F H +  
2 t H +  
ˆ H  
1 t H +   0 
1 ( ) t F H +  
2 t H +  
ˆ H   1 H
⌣
  2 H
⌣
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4.2   The Case with  1 σ > > > >    
In this part we will identify the equilibrium outcomes that transpire when the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution  (1/ ) σ  takes values below one – the case where income effects 
dominate substitution effects. In terms of the optimal allocation of time by young adults, the 
results are summarised in the second part of Proposition 1. In terms of dynamics, however, 
the results are not as rich as those derived in the case where 1/ 1 σ > . We can clarify this 
argument through     
 
Proposition 6. There is a unique asymptotically stable steady state  0 H
+ > . In the transition to this 
stationary equilibrium, the fertility rate declines (increases) towards its long run equilibrium  ( ) ν H
+  as long 
as α ψ >  ( ) α ψ < .  
 







- . Notice that, 
for  1 σ >  it is always true that 0 1 δ ψ < + < . Thus, Proposition 6 follows from the results in 
Propositions 1, 3 (part (i)) and 4.     □    
 
     A straightforward comparison of the outcomes analysed in this part as opposed to those 
analysed in the previous one, allow us to derive an important implication. This implication 
relates to the importance of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and takes the form of   
 
Corollary 1. As long as  , (0,1) ψ αÎ , threshold effects and/or endogenous volatility emerge if and only if 
(0,1) σ Î . 
   
5   The Cyclicality of Fertility Choices 
As I mentioned in a previous part of the paper, empirical evidence suggests that variations in 
fertility appear to be procyclical. Of course, this does not necessarily imply that fertility 
choices  display  the  same  high  frequency  fluctuations  that  we  observe  for  such 
macroeconomic variables as investment and output. Nonetheless, the comparison of waves 
in economic activity and birth rates reveal that periods during which both are either above or 
below their respective trends are remarkably coincidental (Boldrin et al., 2005).   19 
     The current model is able to capture this stylised fact. This can be illustrated as follows. 
In every period there are two cohorts of agents producing output – young adults and old 
adults. Given the model’s assumptions, each young adult earns income according to     
  1 1 1 ( ) ( ) young t t t y H l H H + + + = ,  (15) 
whereas each old adult’s income is equal to       
  1 1 ( ) old t t y H H + + = .  (16) 
The result in Proposition 1 reveals that, as long as parameter values are conducive to the 
emergence of endogenous volatility, it is  1 ( ) 0 t l H + ¢ >  and  1 ( ) 0 t v H + ¢ >  . Therefore, we have 
1 ( ) 0 young t y H + ¢ >  and  1 ( ) 0 old t y H + ¢ >  .  
     Now,  consider  some  period  T   and  suppose  that  the  model  generates  endogenous 
fluctuations, either through damped oscillations or periodic equilibria – say a 2 period cycle. 
It is straightforward to see that   
 
ˆ 0 when ( ) ( ) 0
ˆ ( ) ( )   ,   for  { , }




y H y H
ν H ν H η young old
y H y H
> - >
  - = 
< - <  
.  (17) 
 
The main implication from equation (17) can be summarised in  
 
Corollary 2. When fertility displays endogenous fluctuations, then these fluctuations are procyclical in the 
sense that fertility is above (below) its trend as long as output is above (below) its trend. 
 
6   The Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution and Growth  
 So far, my analysis has been based on a human capital accumulation technology that, due to 
ψ being lower than one, cannot sustain an equilibrium with positive growth in the long run. 
Henceforth, this assumption is relaxed and I set  1 ψ = . In this case, equation (14) is written 





















,  (18) 
where, given (7), the composite parameter term δ  becomes                   20 





= - .  (19) 

















= - = -
+
.  (20) 
Obviously, given  1 0 1
t
t e + £ £ , the additional restriction  1 φ >  is required so as to render 
positive growth possible. With these results in mind, the analysis of the model’s dynamics 
allows us to derive  
 
Proposition 7. Suppose that  1 σ ¹ .   
(i)  If  (0,1) σ Î  then there is an asymptotically stable steady state  1 0 H =
⌢
 and an unstable 
steady state  2 H
⌢
.  For an initial condition below  2 H
⌢
, the stock of human capital declines 
towards  1 0 H =
⌢
 while the fertility rate increases towards  (0) ν . For an initial condition above 
2 H
⌢
, the dynamics of human capital accumulation converge to a long run growth equilibrium 
where  2 lim 1 0 t t g g φ + ®¥ = = - > ⌢ . As the stock of human capital grows continuously, fertility 
declines. 
(ii)  If  1 σ >  then there is a unique asymptotically stable steady state  0 H >
⌢
. In the long run, the 
economy will converge to an equilibrium with zero economic growth, i.e.,  2 lim 0 t t g + ®¥ = . In the 
transition to the stationary equilibrium  H
⌢
, the fertility rate increases towards its long run 




Proof. See the Appendix.   □    
      
     The dynamics of human capital are illustrated in Figures 7 and 8. In terms of intuition, 
the mechanisms are more or less the same to those described in Proposition 3 (part (ii)) and 
Proposition  4.  The  difference  of  course  is  that  positive  long run  growth  is  now  an 
equilibrium outcome. This outcome is not warranted though. Whether it materialises or not 
depends on the value of the parameter σ . This important implication is emphasised in  
   21 
Corollary 3. For an economy whose initial condition exceeds the endogenous threshold  2 H
⌢
, an elasticity of 








1 t H +   0  H
⌢
 
1 ( ) t F H +  








2 t H +  
1 t H +  
 
1 ( ) t F H +    22 
 
7   Conclusion 
What  is  the  underlying  link  between  birth  rates  and  economic  activity?  Under  what 
conditions can we explain the observed patterns in the evolution of fertility rates and per 
capita  GDP?  The  purpose  of  this  paper  was  to  shed  more  light  on  the  fundamental 
mechanisms that shape the relationship between economic activity and demographic change. 
Different combinations of technological and preference parameters have been identified as 
crucial  in  generating  a  variety  of  patterns  on  the  joint  evolution  of  human  capital 
accumulation and fertility rates. These patterns may include threshold effects and multiple 
equilibria  as  well  as  endogenous  fluctuations.  Such  results  find  support  from  existing 
empirical evidence; hence the model offers mechanisms that improve our understanding on 
the possible driving forces behind salient features of demographic transition and economic 
growth.   
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A1   Proof of Proposition 2 
Substituting (10) in (14) yields  





H φ H F H
β
+ + + = =
+
.  (A1.1) 
We can see that there are two possible steady state equilibria.  One is  2 1 0 t t H H + + = =  and 
the other is 
1/(1 )
2 1 [ /(1 )]
ψ
t t H H H φβ β
-
+ + = = = + . Given (A1.1), the derivative of  1 ( ) t F H +  is 
 
1





F H ψφ H
β
-
+ + ¢ =
+
.  (A1.2)   25 
It is straightforward to examine that  (0) F¢ = ¥,  ( ) 0 F¢ ¥ =  and  ( ) (0,1) F H ψ ¢ = Î . Thus, the 
only asymptotically stable equilibrium is  H . Furthermore, from equation (12) we can see 
that  1
t
t n ν + = . Thus, for  1 t H H + <  the stock of human capital grows towards its stationary 
equilibrium but the fertility rate remains constant.    
 
A2   Proof of Proposition 3 
Given (14), we can establish that  (0) 0 F =  and  ( ) F ¥ = ¥. The derivative of  1 ( ) t F H + ¢  is 



















   
¢ = + -     + +    
,   (A2.1) 
which  is  positive  for  ψ α >   Using  (A2.1),  it  is  straightforward  to  establish  ( ) 0 F¢ ¥ = . 




















.  (A2.2) 
Therefore,  when  /(1 ) ψ α σ σ > + -   ( /(1 ) α ψ α σ σ < < + - )  an  equilibrium  with 
2 1 0 t t H H + + = =  is asymptotically stable (unstable).  






















,  (A2.3) 



















.  (A2.4) 



















   
¢ = - - -     + +    
.  (A2.5) 
Using (A2.5), we can show that   




M H α ψ
σ
+ ¢ < + >
-






















 ¢ > + 
- < > 









  + -
=   -  
.  (A2.8) 
     Suppose that  /(1 ) ψ α σ σ < + - . Given (A2.4) and (A2.6), we conclude that there is a 
unique 
* H   such  that 
* ( ) 1 M H =   which,  given  (A2.3),  corresponds  to 
* * ( ) H F H = . 
Furthermore, 
* ( ) 0 M H ¢ <   is  equivalent  to 
* ( ) 1 F H ¢ < .  Combining  these  results  with 
1 ( ) 0 t F H + ¢ >  and (A2.2), we can conclude that 
* H  is the unique asymptotically stable steady 
state. For 
*
1 t H H + <  it is 
*
1 lim t t H H + ®¥ = . During the transition, the fertility declines because 
1 ( ) 0 t ν H + ¢ < .    
     Now, suppose that  /(1 ) ψ α σ σ > + - . As long as  ( ) 1 M X > , equations (A2.4) and (A2.7) 
reveal that there are two equilibria 
* *
3 2 0 H X H > > >  such that 
* *
2 3 ( ) ( ) 1 M H M H = =   and, 
therefore, 
* *
2 2 ( ) H F H =  and 
* *
3 3 ( ) H F H = . Given (A2.7), it is 
* *
2 2 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 M H F H ¢ ¢ > Û >  
and 
* *
3 3 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 M H F H ¢ ¢ < Û < .  Combined  with  1 ( ) 0 t F H + ¢ >   and  (A2.2),  these  results 
reveal that 
*
1 0 H =  and 
*
3 H  are asymptotically stable steady state equilibria. On the one 
hand,  if 
*
1 2 t H H + <   then  1 lim 0 t t H + ®¥ =   and  1 lim ( ) (0) t t v H ν + ®¥ = .  On  the  other  hand,  if 
*
1 2 t H H + >  then 
*
1 3 lim t t H H + ®¥ =  and 
*
1 3 lim ( ) ( ) t t v H ν H + ®¥ = .  
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A3   Proof of Proposition 4 
Consider  (1 ) α ψ σ α > > - . Combining (A2.2) with (7), we can establish that  1 ( ) 0 t F H + ¢ > , 
( ) F ¥ = ¥  and  ( ) 0 F¢ ¥ = .  Furthermore,  (0) 0 F =   and  (0) F¢ = ¥  which  imply  that 
2 1 0 t t H H + + = =  is an unstable steady state. Next, let us use  (1 ) α ψ σ α > > -  in (A2.3) to 
establish that  
  (0) =    and    ( ) 0 M M ¥ ¥ = .  (A3.1) 
Furthermore, applying  (1 ) α ψ σ α > > -  to (A2.5) reveals that  1 ( ) 0 t M H + ¢ < .  
     All these results allow us to verify that there is a unique  H ɶ  such that  ( ) 1 M H = ɶ  or, 
alternatively,  ( ) H F H = ɶ ɶ . Furthermore,  ( ) 0 M H ¢ < ɶ  is equivalent to  ( ) 1 F H ¢ < ɶ . However, it 
is  1 ( ) 0 t F H + ¢ > .  Thus,  H ɶ   is  asymptotically  stable  and  for  1 t H H + < ɶ   it  is  1 lim t t H H + ®¥ = ɶ . 
During the transition, the fertility increases because  1 ( ) 0 t ν H + ¢ > .    
 
A4   Proof of Proposition 5 





























=   - +  
.  (A4.2) 
Notice  that  Ξ 0 >   because  ( ) 0 δ ψ - + >   for  (1 ) ψ σ α < - .  Moreover,  (0) 0 F =   and 
(0) F¢ = ¥. This verifies that  2 1 0 t t H H + + = =  is an unstable steady state. 
     We can also apply  (1 ) ψ σ α < -  to (A2.3) and (A2.4) to derive  (0) = M ¥,  ( ) 0 M ¥ =  and 
1 ( ) 0 t M H + ¢ < .  These  results  imply  that  there  is  a  unique  ˆ H   such  that 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) 1 ( ) M H H F H = Û = . Furthermore,  ˆ ( ) 0 M H ¢ <  or, alternatively,  ˆ ( ) 1 F H ¢ < . In this case, 
however,  we  cannot  make  any  definite  conclusions  concerning  the  stability  of  this 
equilibrium  as  we  do  not  yet  know  whether  ˆ H   lies  on  the  downward  sloping  part  of   28 
1 ( ) t F H + ,  in  which  case  ˆ ( ) 0 F H ¢ < .  For  this  reason,  we  have  to  examine  two  different 
scenarios. 
     Let us begin with the case where  ˆ 1 ( ) 0 F H ¢ - < < . As long as this condition is satisfied, 
ˆ H   is  asymptotically  stable  but  convergence  towards  it  may  be  cyclical  rather  than 
monotonic. We can see this by employing a linear approximation of (14) around  ˆ H  and 
solve for some period T . That is,  
  0 ˆ ˆ ˆ [ ( )] ( )
T
T H H F H H H - = - .  (A4.3) 
Given  ˆ ( ) 0 F H ¢ < , this approximation reveals that for odd (even) values of  T ,  T H  lies 
above (below) its long run equilibrium value. Furthermore, equation (8) reveals that these 
damped oscillations will generate similar oscillations to the fertility rate.            
     Next, let us consider the case where  ˆ ( ) 1 F H ¢ < - . In this situation,  ˆ H  is an unstable 
steady  state.  However,  because  it  lies  on  the  downward  sloping  part  of  the  transition 
equation, the dynamics of human capital will converge to a stable cycle, i.e., the model will 
admit periodic equilibria. This result can be proven as follows. As long as  ˆ ( ) 0 F H ¢ < , any 
ˆ ζ H >  satisfies  ( ) ζ F ζ > . Furthermore, given  (0) ( ) 0 F F = ¥ = , there must be some  ˆ ζ H >  
which is high enough to satisfy  (Ξ) Ξ ζ F > >  (recall that  (Ξ) F  is a global maximum and 
(0) F¢ = ¥)  and  ( ) Ξ F ζ < .  However,  the  latter  implies  that 
2 2 ( ) (Ξ) ( ) F ζ F ζ F ζ < Û > , 
where 
2( ) ( ( )) F ζ F F ζ = .  Therefore,  there  exists  at  least  one  ζ   such  that  ( ) ζ F ζ > , 
2( ) ζ F ζ >   and  therefore,  according  to  Theorem  8.2  in  Azariadis  (1993),  the  condition 
ˆ ( ) 1 F H ¢ < -  is sufficient for the existence of a 2 period cycle (with periodic equilibria  1 H
⌣
 
and  2 H
⌣
) such that  1 2 ˆ 0 H H H ζ < < < <
⌣ ⌣
. Correspondingly, the result in equation (8) reveals 
that the fertility rate will admit periodic equilibria as well.  
 
A5   Proof of Proposition 7 




















,  (A5.1) 




















¢ = -   + +  
.  (A5.2) 

















   
¢ = + - >     + +    
.  (A5.3) 
     Let us begin with the case where  (0,1) σ Î . We can use (A5.1), (A5.2) and (A5.3) to 
establish  that  (0) 0 F¢ = ,  ( ) 1 F φ ¢ ¥ = > ,  (0) 0 M = ,  ( ) 1 M φ ¥ = >   and  1 ( ) 0 t M H + ¢ > . 
Therefore, there is a unique  2 0 H >
⌢
 such that  2 2 2 ( ) 1 ( ) M H F H H = Û =
⌢ ⌢ ⌢
. Furthermore, it is 
2 ( ) 0 M H ¢ >
⌢
 which means that  2 ( ) 1 F H ¢ >
⌢
. This analysis reveals that  1 0 H =
⌢
 is a stable 
equilibrium while  2 H
⌢
 is unstable. If  1 2 t H H + <
⌢
 then  1 lim 0 t t H + ®¥ =  and  1 lim ( ) (0) t t v H ν + ®¥ = . If 
1 2 t H H + >
⌢
  then  1 lim t t H + ®¥ = ¥  because  2 1 t t H H + + >   t " .  Thus,  we  can  use  (20)  to  get  
2
1











- = - >  
 
 which, given (8), means that fertility will decline continuously as 
human capital grows. 
     Now, let us consider  1 σ > . In this case, we have  (0) 1 F φ ¢ = > ,  ( ) 0 F¢ ¥ = ,  (0) 1 M φ = > , 
( ) 0 M ¥ =  and  1 ( ) 0 t M H + ¢ < . Given these,  2 1 0 t t H H + + = =  is an unstable equilibrium while 
0 H >
⌢
  such  that  ( ) 1 ( ) M H F H H = Û =
⌢ ⌢ ⌢
  exists.  It  is  a  stable  steady  state  because 
1 ( ) 0 t F H + ¢ >  , and  ( ) 0 ( ) 1 M H F H ¢ ¢ < Û <
⌢ ⌢
. Therefore,  1 lim t t H H + ®¥ =
⌢
 and, by virtue of (8), 
fertility will be increasing towards  1 lim ( ) ( ) t t v H ν H + ®¥ =
⌢
.          